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I. DESCRIPTION OF NEW YORK CITY'S WATER
SUPPLY SYSTEM.
New York City uses more than 1.2
billion gallons of water per day, which
is supplied by a series of reservoirs located north and west of the City in the
Catskill Mountains. There are three separate watershed areas in the water supply
system:
1. The Croton watershed, located immediately north of the City in Westchester
and Putnam Counties is the oldest, having
been initiated in the late 19th century,
and completed by 1920. It provides 200
million gallons of water per day from a
complex system of controlled lakes and
reservoirs.•
2. The Catskill watershed is situated
in the northern Catskills, about 100 miles
upstate, near Kingston, N. Y. It consists
of two huge reservoirs, which were constructed
• in the 1920's, and supplies about 450 million gallons of water to the City each day.
3. The Delaware Watershed lies in an
area to the Northwest of the City, in the
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western part of the Catskills. There
are three major reservoirs in this system,
and it supplies almost 700 million gallons
per day to the City - approximately 40%
of the supply.
II. LEGAL PROBLEMS INVOLVED WITH THE
DEVELOPMENT OF THE CROTON AND CATSKILL WATERSHED RESERVOIRS.
1. Neither system involves an interstate waterway, so our legal problems lay
entirely within the State of New York.
(a) The City needed State legislation to allow it to condemn property
outside of its boundaries for water supply
purposes. The basic legislation giving us
this right, the Water Supply Act of 1905
requires us to provide water to several
upstate communities and to treat sewage
in some of them.
(b) The condemnation proceedings
we initiated to take title to the 96,000
acres of land we needed for our reservoirs
were hotly contested. In fact a residue
of bitterness on the part of the upstate
citizenry, many of whom lost family homesteads, remains to this day.
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(c) Riparian owners brought claims
against the City for damages suffered when
we obstructed the flow of several rivers
and streams. Thousands of these claims have
yet to be settled, so the City maintains
an office staffed with two attorneys in
Kingston, New York, working on riparian
claims almost exclusively.
III. LEGAL PROBLEMS INVOLVED WITH THE
DEVELOPMENT OF THE DELAWARE WATERSHED.
1. These reservoirs capture water
which would otherwise flow into the Delaware River, an interstate waterway rising
in New York and flowing through New Jersey,
Pennsylvania and Delaware. The Delaware
River provides a primary source of water
to New Jersey and Pennsylvania and is essential to the economy of Delaware , so
a tremendous amount of interstate controversy arose when we initiated our plans
to divert its waters.
2. The first round came in 1929, when
the City began the initial phase of its
Delaware program - construction of the
Pepacton and Neversink Reservoirs.
(a) New Jersey brought suit against
New York State and the City in the U.S.
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Supreme Court. Pennsylvania and Delaware
intervened. Three basic issues were litigated.
1. Was New York City, a municipality
situated outside of the Delaware River
Basin, entitled to divert water for its
use?
2.

If it was, what principles should

be applied to determine what amount it is
entitled to take?
3. Applying such principles, what
quantity of water could the City divert
from the River?
(b) The Court appointed a Special
Master, who submitted his report two years
later, finding:
1. The City was entitled to
take water from the River. Utilization of
the portion of the Delaware River lying
within its borders, the Special Master found,
is a matter left to the discretion of the
State of New York. If it opts to allow the
City to divert water for water supply purposes, (which the Master felt was the highest
use to which a river can be put) it can do
so. Even though the City lies within the
basin of the Hudson River, a major waterway
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which could be used to supply its water,
it may, with the permission of the State,
select to import the higher quality water
of the Delaware River.
2. However, this right must
be limited by the application of certain
principles. The Special Master found that
neither the doctrine of Riparian Rights
nor that of Prior Appropriation could properly be applied, so he developed the Doctrine of Equitable Apportionment, suggesting that the waters of the Delaware be distributed among the States according to the
principles of equity.
3. Applying such principles,
he recommended that the City be allowed to
divert 440 million gallons per day. The
City had requested 600 m.g.d.
The Court approved the Special Master's
report in one of Justice Holmes' most notable opinions. N.J. v. N.Y. 283 U.S. 336
(1931).
3. The second round came in the
early 1950's, when the City sought to construct the Cannonsville Reservoir. The
City made an application to amend the 1931
decree, to allow it to divert up to 800 m.g.d.
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Again a Special Master was appointed;
testimony was taken and negotiations
were convened over a period which lasted
for two years. The parties were able to
negotiate a consent decree which was
adopted by the Court in 1954. N.J. v. N.Y.
347 U.S. 995 (1954).
(a) The heart of the amended decree was the so called "Montague formula".
Simply stated, this formula allowed the
City to divert up to 800 M.G.D. from all
of its Delaware Reservoirs, provided that
it made sufficient releases back to the
River to maintain a streamf low at Montague,
New Jersey of at least 1750 cubic feet per
second at all times.
1. This scheme was designed
to allow the City to divert enough water
to meet its needs while maintaining a large
enough streamflow to continuously repel
the "salt front" which would otherwise
creep upstream from Delaware Bay, threatening water supplies in New Jersey and Pennsylvania.
2.

It was founded upon various

technical assumptions including the "drought
of record", the one which took place in the
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Northeast in the 1930's. It was anticipated that no more severe a drought would
be experienced.
(b) A River Master was appointed
to oversee the City's compliance with the
Montague formula, and to undertake other
activities to "conserve the waters of the
basin".
4. The third roUnd came after 1961,
when the Delaware River Basin Compact was
signed, bringing the Delaware River Basin
Commission into existence.
(a) This compact, which is cited
as Pub. L. 87-328 [75 Stat. 688], contains
several important provisions including:
1. Section 3.3, which provides
DRBC with extraordinary powers to be used
in the event of a water supply emergency:
including the power to alter the diversions and releases of the decree with the
unanimous consent of the Commission members (the City of New York, a party to the
decree is not a "member" of the Commission it must rely upon the State of N.Y. to represent its interests in a water supply
emergency.)
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2.

Section 3.5 prohibits the

DRBC from altering the diversions and releases of the City reservoirs without the
unanimous consent of the parties to the 1954
decree, except during an emergency.
3.

Section 3.4, whereby all of

the signatory parties (including New York
State, New Jersey, Pennsylvania and Delaware)
absolutely waived their rights to seek an
amendment to the 1954 decree for a period
of 100 years.
(b) In the mid-60's a drought much
more severe than the "drought of record",
the one experienced in the 1930's, occurred.
Compliance with Montague formula, based
as it was on a less severe drought, led to
the near depletion of the reservoirs, and
to the declaration of a water supply emergency by DRBC.
1. The Commission declared this
emergency only after the City abruptly
ceased making releases at the direction of
the River Master and streamf low fell sharply.
2. The administrative proceedings which ensued, therefore took place in
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an atmosphere of crisis and interstate
acrimony. However, emergency orders
were issued cutting back diversions and
releases, and imposing conservation requirements, so the emergency was abated.
5. The fifth round of controversy
took place in the 1970's. Pennsylvania
and New Jersey had intended to cope with
the water supply problems made apparent
by the drought of the 1960's by constructing a large reservoir on the mainstream
of the Delaware. However, this reservoir
(known as "Tock's Island") was to be
situated near the scenic Delaware Water
Gap, and an environmental and political
controversy flared. The project was abandoned in 1977 when Congress (with the support of the Governor of New York State)
declared the area to be a wild and scenic
preserve.
(a) Pennsylvania, in reaction,
introduced a resolution in the DRBC in
1978 which called for the parties to the
decree to renegotiate the Montague formula,
and threatened to seek to reopen the decree
(despite the waiver contained in the compact)
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if such negotiations were unsuccessful.
1. The City objected, but recognizing that the drought of the 1960's
undercut the Montague formula, the parties
negotiated a resolution which called for
"good faith" discussions to develop a longterm drought contingency plan which would
reduce the diversions and releases of the
decree in the event of a severe shortage.
2. The "good faith" negotiations
took place from 1979-1980, but were suspended when a severe drought hit the northeast in the fall of 1980. The "good faith"
negotiators turned their attention to
dealing with the drought of the 1980's.
(b) This drought was nearly as severe
as the drought of the 1960's, but the negotiations were not so acrimonious.
1. A technical consensus had already been negotiated fixing the point at
which a drought "warning" and a drought
"emergency" would be declared by the Commission. This point was based upon the
water level in the New York City Delaware
Basin reservoirs.
2. The parties had already gone
some way towards developing a phased
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diversion/release cutback scheme, keyed
to the depth of the drought.
3. A consensus had already been
reached as to the basic elements of a
common conservation plan.
(c) DRBC emergency orders, containing specific diversion and release cutbacks were negotiated and implemented in
three stages during the drought. The final stage, which became effective during
the most severe part of the drought reduced
the City's diversion to 520 m.g.d. and reduced the releases required to maintain
streamf low at Montague at levels varying
from 1550 to 1100 c.f.s. depending upon
the geographical location of the salt front.
(d) It rained in February, 1981 and
ample rain has continued since that time
so the reservoirs are now full, and the
"good faith" discussions have been resumed.
A proposed agreement is nearing completion,
and will shortly be undergoing public review.
It contains recommendations for control of the advancing salt front, for regulation of consumptive and depletive uses,
as well as emergency measures to be taken
during future times.
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